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Abstract. Following Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical and practical 
rationality, Max Weber holds that beliefs about the world and actions within the 
world must follow procedures consistently and be appropriately formed if they are 
to count as rational. Here, I argue that Weber’s account of theoretical and practical 
rationality, as disclosed through his conception of the disenchantment of the 
world, displays a confessional architecture consistently structured by a nineteenth 
century German Protestant outlook. I develop this thesis through a review of the 
concepts of rationality and disenchantment in Weber’s major works and conclude 
that this conceptual framework depicts a Protestant account of modernity.
I. INTERPRETING WEBER’S CENTRAL CONCEPTS
One of the major diffi culties facing the interpreter of Weber’s works and 
especially his concepts of disenchantment and rationality is that he applies 
these central concepts to a vast range of processes and social spheres. Some 
scholars, such as Friedrich Tenbruch, for example, have suggested that the 
concept of disenchantment is the central concept of Weber’s whole work 
such that it gives Weber’s work an “inner unity”.1 In his Das Werk Max 
Webers, Tenbruch argued that the previous dominant account of Weber’s 
work given by Reinhard Bendix had failed to take into account that 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (WuG) was not the key text, as Bendix had 
argued, but rather that Die Wirtschaft Ethik der Weltreligionen (WEWR) 
was the guiding text for his work. There followed chronological debates 
about the composition of Weber’s texts in order to fi nd the earliest use of 
1 See Friedrich Tenbruch, Das Werk Max Webers. Gesammelte Aufsätze zu Max We-
ber, herausgegeben von Harald Homman, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1999, pp. 59-98.
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the term Entzauberung (disenchantment) and to investigate the claims of 
Tenbruch for fi nding Entzauberung to be the hermeneutical key of Weber’s 
works. These chronological systematic debates over the work of Weber are 
important because of the fact that many of Weber’s texts have been published 
posthumously by his wife Marianne and so one can gain a false impression 
of Weber without being aware of the unusual Redakionsgeschichte of the 
Weberian opus.2 As a result of these debates it is important to stress that in 
arguing for the importance of the Protestant heritage of Weber’s work I am 
not claiming to have found the single hermeneutical key to unlock the inner 
secret of his works but rather that reading them in this light illuminates 
patterns and motifs which have been under theorised in the past.
The concept of rationality is used by Weber in a number of different 
ways. Chiefl y, it distinguishes the formal rationality of the economic, legal, 
and bureaucratic systems which subsume decisions under general rules 
and so allow one to calculate the likelihood of a particular outcome, from 
the substantive rationality of these systems when they aim to distribute 
goods in a particular way or to bring about some substantive end that fulfi ls 
a publically defi ned purpose.3 Moreover, Weber also uses the concept 
of rationality to distinguish between instrumental rationality or as Weber 
sometimes refers to it “purposive rationality” (Zweckrationalität), which is 
a form of means-ends rationality that is determined by expectations as to the 
behaviour of objects in the environment and other human beings, and value-
rationality (Wertrationalität), which is a teleological mode of thinking and 
action that is determined by a set of deeply held beliefs chosen regardless 
of consequences.4 The challenge of interpreting Weber’s central concept 
of rationality is to understand just how it is intimately connected to his 
theory of action and to his analysis of rationalisation in world history.5
2 A good example of the importance of this editorial issue here is demonstrated by the 
different versions of Weber’s famous Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (PE). 
The 1904/5 version and the 1920 version together with the various replies to Weber’s crit-
ics written between 1907-10, constitute signifi cantly different texts. On this, see David J. 
Chalcraft and Austin Harrington (eds.) The Protestant Ethic Debate, translated by Austin 
Harrington and Mary Shields, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2001, pp. 1-19.
3 See Jon Elster, “Rationality, Economy, and Society,” in Stephen Turner (ed.) The Cam-
bridge Companion to Weber, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 21-41.
4 See WuG, p. 12.
5 See, Donald W. Levine, “The Continuing Challenge of Weber’s Theory of Rational 
Action,” in Charles C. Camic, Philip S. Gorski, and David M. Trubek (eds.) Max Weber’s 
Economy and Society. A Critical Companion, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005, 
pp. 101-126.
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II. WEBER ON DISENCHANTMENT AND RATIONALITY
1. The Protestant Ethic
In the 1920 version of PE,6 Weber notes:
Disenchantment of the world. On this process see the other essays in my 
Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Already, the peculiar position of the 
old Israelite ethic, as compared with the closely related ethics of Egypt and 
Babylon, and its development after the time of the prophets, rested, as is shown 
there, entirely on this fundamental fact, the rejection of sacramental magic as 
a road to salvation.7
Central to Weber’s conception of Disenchantment of the World is the 
rejection of the sacramental mediation of salvation. For Weber, the human 
mediation of salvation is magic (as for Calvin), since it implies that humans 
can have infl uence on the will of God like ancient magicians infl uenced the 
will of the gods by sacrifi cial practices. Without the route of sacramental 
mediation the believer could be reassured of their salvation through either 
being a vessel of the Holy Spirit (Luther) or as a tool of the divine will 
(Calvin).
The religious virtuoso can make himself sure of his state of grace either in that 
he feels himself to be the vessel of the Holy Spirit or the tool of the divine will. 
In the former case his religious life tends to mysticism and emotionalism, in 
the latter to ascetic action; Luther stood close to the former type, Calvinism 
belonged defi nitely to the latter. The Calvinist also wanted to be saved »sola 
fi de«. But since Calvin viewed all pure feelings and emotions, no matter 
how exalted they might seem to be, with suspicion, faith had to be proved 
by its objective results in order to provide a fi rm foundation for the certitudo 
salutis. It must be a »fi des effi cax«, the call to salvation an »effectual calling« 
(expression used in Savoy Declaration).8
6 It should be noted that Weber uses the word Entzauberung four times in the 1920 edi-
tion but not at all in the 1904/5 edition. See GARS I, pp. 94, 114, 156, 158 (critical edition: 
Anhang N. 163, 242, 331, 337.)
7 GARS I, p. 94, N° 3. “Entzauberung der Welt. Ueber diesen Prozeß s. die Aufsätze 
über die »Witschaftsethik der Weltreligionen«. Schon die Sonderstellung der altisraeliti-
schen Ethik gegenüber der ihr inhaltlich nahe verwandten ägyptischen und babylonischen 
und ihre Entwicklung seit der Prophetenzeit beruhte, wie sich dort zeigen wird, ganz und 
gar auf diesem Grundsachverhalt: der Ablehnung der sakramentalen Magie als Heilsweg.”
8 PE, pp. 108-9. “Der religiöse Virtuose kann seines Gnadenstandes sich versichern 
entweder, indem er sich als Gefäß, oder, indem er sich als Werkzeug göttlicher Macht fühlt. 
Im ersten Fall neigt sein religiöses Leben zu mystischer Gefühlskultur, im letzteren zu aske-
tischem Handeln. Dem ersten Typus stand Luther näher, dem letztern gehörte der Calvinis-
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With this salvation typology, human action is emptied of any positive 
soteriological signifi cance and we see a resulting twofold separation of 
grace and nature. Nature can no longer mediate grace and human action 
can no longer cooperate with grace. Disenchantment thus represents 
a secularisation of the soteriological signifi cance of human action.
One can also see in Weber the disenchantment motif expressed in terms 
of a transposition of religious values from the spiritual realm to the secular 
realm. Thus the idea that once people had a religious vocation to leave the 
world and enter a monastery becomes understood by Weber (following 
Luther) as the calling or vocation to secular activity. The disenchantment 
of religious life leads to a devaluation of special religious activities and 
rather values the ordinary activities in the world.9 This devaluating is to be 
understood by Weber as a result of an alternative conception of rationality 
that develops as religions themselves go through an inner rationalisation 
which tends to shift them into the irrational sphere.
The general result of the modern form of thoroughly rationalising the 
conception of the world and of the way of life, theoretically and practically, 
in an intellectual and purposive manner, has been that the more this type of 
rationality has progressed, from the standpoint of an intellectual articulation 
of an image of the world, the more religion has been shifted into the realm of 
the irrational.10
Central here to Weber’s conception of Disenchantment of the World 
is his understanding of purposive rationality (instrumental rationality). 
Purposive rationality has two meanings in the Einleitung:
 1. The theoretical mastery of the world as we gain ever more precise 
and abstract concepts due to the rationalisation of the magical image 
of the world.
mus an. »Sola fi de« wollte auch der Reformierte selig werden. Aber da schon nach Calvins 
Ansicht alle bloßen Gefühle und Stimmungen, mögen sie noch so erhaben zu sein schei-
nen, trügerisch sind, muß der Glaube sich in seinen objektiven Wirkungen bewähren, um 
der certitdo salutis als sichere Unterlage dienen zu können: er muß eine »fi dex effi cax«, die 
Berufung zum Heil ein »effectual calling« (Ausdruck der Savoy declaration) sein.”
9 Charles Taylor speaks in his Sources of the Self of the “affi rmation of the ordinary” as 
a central motif of the emergence of modernity, see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. The 
Making of Modern Identity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 211-302.
10 GARS I, p. 253. “Die moderne Form der zugleich theoretischen und praktischen 
intellektuellen und zweckhaften Durchrationalisierung des Weltbildes und der Lebensfüh-
rung hat die allgemeine Folge gehabt: daß die Religion, je weiter diese besondere Art von 
Rationalisierung fortschritt, desto mehr ihrerseits in das – vom Standpunkt einer intellektu-
ellen Formung des Weltbildes ausgesehen:– Irrationale geschoben wurde.”
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 2. The practical mastery of the world through a means-ends method-
ological rationality. 
Both of these dimensions of purposive rationality are responsible for 
the Disenchantment of the World. Historically signifi cant for this process 
has been the combination of religious virtuosos into an ascetic sect as in 
Western ascetical Protestantism. This dethroned the privileging of contem-
plation over action and further reinforced the rejection of the sacramental 
mediation of salvation. The result of this changing scale of value meant 
that there was a shift of focus for religion from what Weber calls non-ratio-
nal action oriented away from the present world to rational action oriented 
towards the transformation of everyday life in this present world.
It was totally different when the religiously qualifi ed virtuosos combined 
together into an active ascetical sect to strive to shape life in the world according 
to the will of God… Two aims were completely attained: the disenchantment 
of the world and the blockage of the path to salvation by a fl ight from the 
world. The path to salvation is turned away from a contemplative ‘fl ight from 
the world’ and towards an active ascetic ‘work in the world.’ If one disregards 
the small rationalist sects, such as are found all over the world, this has been 
attained only in the great church and sect organisation of Occidental and 
ascetical Protestantism.11
This passage illustrates the role that Weber understands Protestantism 
to have played in the rationalisation of the world. At the theoretical level, 
ascetic Protestantism developed an answer to the question of theodicy based 
on Luther’s notion of the Deus absconditus which rejected metaphysical 
speculation about God as being the work of the Devil, and which was further 
elaborated in Calvin’s doctrine of predestination. This led to a rejection of 
the soteriological signifi cance of human action as in Catholicism, which 
derived from the scholastic metaphysical view of the grace of God in 
Creation, and issued in a new non-metaphysical theology (sola scriptura) 
based on a theologia crucis,12 which saw salvation as totally out of the 
11 GARS I, pp. 262-3. “Ganz anders da, wo das Virtuosentum der religiös Qualifi zier-
ten sich zu einer asketischen, die Formung des Lebens in der Welt nach dem Willen eines 
Gottes erstrebenden Sekte zusammenschloß...Voll erreicht wurde beides: Entzauberung der 
Welt und Verlegung des Weges zum Heil von kontemplativen »Weltfl ucht« hinweg in die 
aktiv asketische »Weltbearbeitung«, – wenn man von einigen kleinen rationalistischen Sek-
ten, wie sie sich in aller Welt fanden, absieht, – nur in den großen Kirchen– und Sektenbil-
dungen des asketischen Protestantismus im Okzident.”
12 For an excellent discussion of this theological transformation see, , Gerhard Ebe-
ling, Luther: An Introduction to his Thought, translated by R. A. Wilson, London, Collins, 
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hands of humanity. At the practical level, due to the changed understanding 
of works, the Catholic conception of the positive contribution to salvation 
by human action was further undermined and was eventually seen as no 
longer having any active contribution to make to salvation. Thus, since 
human thought could no longer penetrate the hidden mysteries of God, 
and human action could no longer actively contribute to salvation, then 
the way was now opened for both action and thought to be governed by 
purposive or instrumental rationality and not according to metaphysical 
speculation, mystical contemplation and the religious asceticism of the 
Catholic tradition. 
2. Rationalisation in Asian Religions
Weber uses his measurement of the degree of disenchantment as a way of 
assessing the level of rational advancement of a religion. In his study of 
Confucianism and Taoism he notes that:
In assessing the stage of rationalisation embodied by any religion there are two 
particular criteria which are, in addition, in many respects internally related to 
each other. There is fi rst of all the extent to which a religion has freed itself from 
magic. Then secondly, the extent of the systematic uniformity brought forth by 
the religion to the relationship between God and world, and accordingly to the 
religion’s own ethical relation towards the world.13
In this fi nal chapter of his study of the religions of China, Weber is 
opposing Puritanism and Confucianism on the basis of a degree of 
disenchantment and hence of the capacity for generating an inner-worldly 
ethic. He argues that Protestantism represents the most developed form of 
religion because it has most systematically eliminated the magical means 
of salvation, and the ascetic action of Protestantism has most effectively 
led to an inner-worldly oriented ethic (He considers Confucianism to hold 
an “enchanted garden” vision of ethics).
In his Zwischenbetrachtung at the end of Gesammelte Aufsätze zur 
Religionssoziologie (GARS I), Weber describes the process of rationalisation 
1972, pp. 226-241. Key to understanding Luther is his reading of St. Paul’s letters concern-
ing the futility of a philosophical conception of God, such as in: 1 Corinthians, 18-19, for 
example.
13 GARS I, p. 512. “Für die Stufe der Rationalisierung, welche eine Religion represän-
tiert, gibt es vor allem zwei, übrigens miteinander in vielfacher innerer Beziehung stehen-
de Maßstabe. Einmal der Grad, in welchem sie die Magie abgestreift hat. Dann der Grad 
systematischer Einheitlichkeit, in welche das Verhältnis von Gott und Welt und demgemäß 
die eigene ethische Beziehung zur Welt von ihr gebracht worden ist”.
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on the cultural spheres as a journey towards disenchantment. In the clash 
of religion with the intellectual sphere, he notes:
The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge defi nitely comes 
to the fore wherever rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked 
through to the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal 
mechanism. For then science encounters claims of the ethical postulate that 
the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and ethically 
oriented, cosmos. In principle, the empirical as well as the mathematically 
oriented view of the world develops refutations of every intellectual approach 
which in any case asks for a ‘meaning’ of inner-worldly occurrences. Every 
increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion from 
the rational into the irrational realm; but only today does religion become the 
irrational or anti-rational supra-human power.14 (Zwischenbetrachtung)
Thus as the cultural spheres rationalise meaning becomes increasingly 
scarce. The separation of the original magical-religious traces of knowledge 
from the developed rationalised spheres of culture, the Disenchantment of 
the World, thus comes at a price. The objectively given sense of meaning of 
previous ages is now no longer to be found but must rather be produced.15 
14 GARS I, p. 564. “Wo immer aber rational empirisches Erkennen die Entzauberung 
der Welt und deren Verwandlung in einen kausalen Mechanismus konsequent vollzogen 
hat, tritt die Spannung gegen die Ansprüche des ethischen Postulates: daß die Welt ein gott-
geordneter, also irgendwie ethisch sinnvoll orientierter Kosmos sei, endgültig hervor. Denn 
die empirische und vollends die mathematisch orientierte Weltbetrachtung entwickelt prin-
zipiell die Ablehnung jeder Betrachtungsweise, welche überhaupt nach einem »Sinn« des 
innerweltlichen Geschehens fragt. Mit jeder Zunahme des Rationalismus der empirischen 
Wissenschaft wird dadurch die Religion zunehmend aus dem Reich des Rationalen ins 
Irrationale verdrängt und nun erst: die irrationale oder antirational überpersönliche Macht 
schlechthin”.
15 The question of meaning and how one arrives at something that marks the modern 
period from its predecessors. The modern opposition between “nature” and “culture” was 
known to the Greeks but not accepted (Lucretius De rerum natura, Bk V. For the Greeks, 
true wisdom consists of submitting to nature not in vain attempts to overcome it. This 
changes in the Italian Renaissance. Increasingly, the idea develops that one should refuse 
to accept nature as simply given. Thus, for example, Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio speaks 
of the human as a protean being without a fi xed nature and able to assume any. The Chris-
tian Middle Ages also followed the Greeks in accepting a rational order to the cosmos as 
a divinely given reality. Thus the political structure had to conform to the cosmic hierarchy 
as Thomas’s De Regimine Principium and Dante’s De Monarchia show. This view of the 
intrinsic rational order of the world begins to disintegrate in the nominalism of the late Mid-
dle Ages as notions of the cultural dominance of inert nature come to the fore. On this issue, 
see Louis Dupré “The Modern Idea of Culture: Its Opposition to Its Classical and Christian 
Roots”, in Ralph McInerney (ed.) Modernity and Religion, Notre Dame, University of No-
tre Dame Press, 1994, pp. 1-18.
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Weber suggests that the three most rational routes of responding to this 
are to be found in:
 i. The metaphysical route of the Indian religions.
 ii. The ontological route of dualism in Zoroastrianism.
 iii. The ethical route of Protestantism.
These are the three most consistent ways that Weber sees of responding 
to the theodicy challenge. 
At the end of his consideration of Indian religions, he attempts to pull 
his fi ndings together by comparing India with the West. In India, Weber 
fi nds a privileging of the monastic path to salvation. The consequence 
of this is that Indian paths to salvation prioritised special knowledge, 
philosophy or mysticism, which was the privilege of the few. This mystical 
soteriology thus led to a form of worship of the holy man or guru as the 
one who knew. Weber considers the power of the guru to be a charismatic 
power, a form of magic which together with the power of the family and 
other magical practices determined the course of Asiatic social order. 
His distinction between magic and a miracle is instructive in this regard 
because it acts a paradigmatic example for the differences in the modes of 
religious rationality.
The meaning of the “miracle” is always seen as an act of some rational world-
guidance, of a divine conferring of grace and tends to be more interiorly 
motivated than the “spell” whose meaning is that the whole world is fi lled with 
irrationally effective magical powers. These magical powers are stored up in 
charismatically qualifi ed, but according to their freely arbitrary acting essence, 
men or supermen, through their ascetical or contemplative achievements.16
Weber’s basic categories developed in speaking of Western rationality 
are used in his study of the religions of India. The opposition between 
contemplation and action, mysticism and asceticism structures his whole 
analysis of rationality, social action and the progress of modernity. He uses 
the biblical characters of Martha-Mary to represent this in a number of 
places in his sociology of religion and his use is instructive.
16 GARS II, p. 370. “Das »Wunder« wird seinem Sinn nach stets als Akt einer ir-
gendwie rationalen Weltlenkung, einer göttlichen Gnadenspendung, angesehen werden und 
pfl egt daher innerlich motivierter zu sein als der »Zauber«, der seinem Sinn nach dadurch 
ensteht, daß die ganze Welt von magischen Potenzen irrationaler Wirkungsart erfüllt ist und 
daß diese in charismatisch qualifi zierten, aber nach ihrer eigenen freien Willkür handelnden 
Wesen, Menschen oder Uebermenschen, durch asketische oder kontemplative Leistungen 
aufgespeichert sind”.
125DISENCHANTMENT, RATIONALITY AND THE MODERNITY OF MAX WEBER
Contemplation is viewed as being separate from action, as passive and 
other-worldly. This again is a Protestant motif arising out of the separation 
of grace and nature. What was there to contemplate when all was a mas-
sa perditionis! As grace no longer permeated nature, there opened up an 
unbridgeable gap between heaven and earth. This was expressed in Luther’s 
notion of the Deus absconditus, and it structured the Protestant imagina-
tion. Catholicism too for Weber stood on the enchanted side of the garden 
due to its belief in the sacramental mediation of salvation.
3. The Origins of Disenchantment in Ancient Judaism
One would be wrong to see this process of disenchantment as originating 
in the Protestant Reformation. Weber fi nds its seeds in his study of Ancient 
Judaism. Even though the actual word “Entzauberung” does not occur in the 
text, the process which it describes is clearly present. In Reinhard Bendix’s 
study of Weber he suggests that the key intuition into the importance of 
ancient Judaism for his study of Western rationalism was the substitution 
of law for magic:
Free of magic and esoteric speculation, devoted to the study of law, vigilant in 
the effort to do “what was right in the eyes of the Lord” in the hope of a better 
future, the prophets established a religion of faith that subjected man’s daily 
life to the imperatives of a divinely ordained moral law. In this way ancient 
Judaism helped create the moral rationalism of Western civilization.17
Thus, for Weber, a process is begun in ancient Judaism which reaches 
its climax in ascetical Protestantism. The rationalisation of the religious 
ethic occurs through prophetic movements as the moral principles are 
codifi ed as the law of Yahweh as a consequence of the Josianic reforms 
of the deuteronomic tradition. The upshot of this is a rejection of magic as 
a response to the theodicy question.
In practice, the rejection of magic meant primarily that, unlike the process 
elsewhere, it was not systematised by priests for the sake of the taming of the 
masses…One of the fundamental theses even of the fi rst prophet (Amos) was 
that Yahweh also sent all evil. In Israel, all evil was punishment or ordainment 
of the powerful god. Therefore, the development of the magical defence 
against demons was confronted with that of the purely ethical Torah and with 
the confession of sins as genuine means of control in the hands of the Levitical 
17 Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber and Intellectual Portrait (Berkeley, University of Ca-
lifornia Press, 1977), p. 256.
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priests. This exerted an all-pervasive infl uence upon the religious development 
of Israel.18
In thus rejecting the magical practices as ways of dealing with the real-
ity of evil, Weber sees Israel’s conscious rejection of the Babylonian dual-
ism to lead to the ethical response to the theodicy question which charac-
terises inner-worldly religions from Judaism to ascetical Protestantism.19 
This represents the origin of the process of disenchantment which will 
eventually lead to its logical conclusion in the Puritanical groups of Prot-
estantism. It also reinforces a central opposition that Weber suggests exists 
between mystical contemplation, as practiced in India, and inner-worldly 
asceticism.20 It reinforces this binary opposition because for magic, one 
can read “mystical contemplation,” whilst for ethics, one can read “inner-
worldly rational action and knowledge.” This opposition between magic 
and knowledge is embodied in the institutionalisation of the legal reforms 
of the Torah in the deuteronomic tradition. It represents the way in which 
the contractual agreement of Yahweh and Israel in the Berith, or Covenant, 
is made manifest in the social organisation of the community of Israel.21
In following the ethical route to salvation spiritual capital was 
effectively democratised in ancient Judaism and Protestantism. Shifting 
spiritual capital from the enchanted garden of the monastery to the world 
of ordinary life was a key development, for Weber, in the Disenchantment 
of the World. Rather than mystical union being the goal, as in India, the 
aim of ancient Judaism was right action governed by divine law.
4. Models of Rationality in Weber’s Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
In Weber’s Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (WuG) his use of the concepts of 
asceticism and mysticism rests upon the differentiation of Lutheranism and 
18 AJ, pp. 236-7. “Die Verwerfung der Magie bedeutete praktisch vor allem: daß sie 
nicht, wie anderwärts, von den Priestern zwecks Domestikation der Massen systematise-
riert wurde…Daß auch alles Uebel von Jahwe stamme, war eine der Grundthesen schon des 
ersten Propheten (Amos). Der Entwicklung der magischen Dämonenabwehr stand daher in 
Israel, wo alles Uebel Strafe oder Verfügung des mächtigen Gottes war, die Entwicklung 
der rein ethischen Priesterthora und Sündenbeichte als des eigentlichen Machtmittels der 
levitischen Priester gegenüber. Dies wirkte durch das ganze Gebiet der religiösen Entwick-
lung Israels hindurch.”
19 As in his study on India, Weber discusses the important difference between miracles 
and magic in terms of the increase of rationality that the religious understanding of miracles 
represents. See AJ, pp. 236-237.
20 Cf., Bendix, 1977, op cit., p. 200.
21 See AJ, p. 233.
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Calvinism as defi ned by Matthias Schneckenburger in his Vergleichende 
Darstellung des lutherischen und reformierten Lehrbegriffs of 1855.22 In 
his sociology of religion section of WuG, he sees asceticism as a religiously 
guided form of permanent behaviour. Contemplation for him is a certain 
type of consciousness in which the certainty of salvation is manifested. 
The categories of contemplation and action, mysticism and asceticism are 
used as typological markers to chart the progress of Western rationalism in 
the development from the darkness of magic to the light of reason.
The decisive historical difference between the predominantly oriental and 
Asiatic types of salvation religion and those found primarily in the Occident is 
that the former usually culminate in contemplation and the latter in asceticism. 
The great importance of this distinction, for our purely empirical consideration 
of religions, is in no way diminished by the fact that the distinction is a fl uid 
one. Recurrent combinations of mystical and ascetic characteristics demonstrate 
that these heterogeneous elements may combine, as in the monastic religiosity 
of the Occident. For our concern is with the consequences for action.23
This passage brings out clearly the elegant sleight of hand that Weber 
uses to organise his sociology of religion and theory of action. Since 
contemplation and action follow the principle of ora et labora, then whilst 
the West has examples of the contemplative type it is really in the East, most 
especially in India, that these techniques of ensuring a permanent sense 
of one’s own salvation have been most rationally developed. However, 
Weber’s typology really understands ora et labora as ora aut labora, 
that is to say either contemplation or action. He rules out ora in labora 
which is one of the key intuitions of the Catholic Reformation or Counter 
Reformation. This sleight of hand rules out any sociological signifi cance 
being attributed to mysticism for action, as whilst the distinction may be 
“fl uid”, and combinations have occurred, clearly Weber understands these 
22 On the importance of Schneckenburger’s analysis of the differences between Lu-
theranism and Calvinism for Weber’s construction of PE, see Friedrich Wilhelm Graf “The 
German Theological Sources and Protestant Church Politics” in Lehmann, Hartmut and 
Günther, Roth (eds.) Weber’s Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 34-41.
23WuG, p. 334. “Es ist nun der historisch entscheidende Unterschied, der vorwie-
gend morgenländischen und asiatischen, gengenüber den vorwiegend okzidentalen Arten 
der Erlösungsreligionsität, daß die ersteren wesentlich in Kontemplation, die letzteren in 
Askese ausmünden. Daß der Unterschied ein fl üssiger ist, daß ferner die mannigfachen 
stets wiederkehrenden Kombinationen von mystischen und asketischen Zügen, z. B. in der 
Mönchreligiosität des Abendlands, die Vereinbarkeit dieser an sich heterogenen Elemente 
zeigen, dies alles ändert nichts an der großen Bedeutung des Unterschiedes selbst für unsere 
rein empirische Betrachtung. Denn der Effekt im Handeln ist es, der uns angeht”.
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“combinations” within his ora aut labora typology, and thus it has no real 
sociological relevance, since he assumes contemplation and action to be 
mutually exclusive. That is to say, whilst means (mysticism and asceticism) 
may combine, ends (contemplation and action) cannot.24 Moreover, this 
passage brings out clearly the confusion of the historical and analytical 
levels in Weber’s sociology of religion which have had major implications 
for his theory of action. In tying his analytical separation of asceticism 
and mysticism to the historical distinctions between the Occidental and the 
Indian salvation religions, he effectively eliminates the historical category 
of mysticism from having sociological signifi cance in the Western world 
after the medieval Catholic organic ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas. This, of 
course, makes the narration of the Disenchantment of the World and of the 
rise of Western rationalism a much neater tale. However, we can now see 
more clearly that it distorts the picture of the historical development of the 
Western world according to the Protestant metanarrative.
As Schluchter notes, Weber’s Einleitung even lags behind WuG in 
regard to precision in separating the analytical and historical levels of 
analysis.25 Here Weber drops the distinction of world-rejecting asceticism 
24 Schluchter attempts to correct this assumption of Weber by analytically separating 
out activity and passivity from a presumed homogeneously constituted passive contempla-
tion and active asceticism. However, he effectively diffuses the sociological potential of 
contemplation for a theory of action by limiting the attitude to the world held by an active 
contemplative or a passive ascetic to indifference or accepting one’s fate in the world. See 
Schluchter, Wolfgang, “Weber’s Sociology of Rationalism and Typology of Religious Re-
jections of the World,” in Lash, Scott and Whimster, Sam (eds.) Max Weber, Rationality and 
Modenrity, London, Allen and Unwin, 1987, pp. 109-115. Thus the potential for a theory 
of contemplative action in Schluchter’s reconstruction of Weber remains sociologically de-
fused since, while he allows for contemplation and action, in the examples of the medieval 
Catholicism of Thomism and Brahmism, a strategy of organic relativisation following We-
ber’s allusion at the end of the Intermediate Refl ections, he sees this within a framework 
of dualism. Thus, following Weber, he suggests that the combination of contemplation and 
an inner-worldly vocational ethic, the third form of theodicy dealt with by Weber in the 
Intermediate Refl ections, was peculiar to the Indian intellectuals (see Intermediate Refl ec-
tions, p. 359). Hence the combination of contemplation and action, by Schluchter, is with-
in a framework of metaphysical dualism (or pluralism) in which this world and the other 
world remain securely in place, and hierocratic and political power separated (ora et labora 
and not ora in labora).
25 See Schluchter, op cit., pp. 106-107. Schluchter suggests that the key point is not 
simply terminological here, but rather the need to broaden the typology of asceticism and 
mysticism in order to better understand the impact of the religious rejection of the world for 
elaborating a better typology of attitudes towards the world and hence more sophisticated 
action theory. In doing this, Schluchter suggests that three aspects need to be analytically 
separated. First, the relation between the divine, man and the world. Second, the attitude 
of the person towards the world: either directed towards the world or away from the world, 
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and considers both mysticism and asceticism as types of salvation which 
reject the world. Yet, he continues to contrast the various types of world 
rejection in the Einleitung according to the inner-worldly and other-
worldly (fl ight-from-the-world) schema of WuG. This results in him no 
longer distinguishing between inner-worldly asceticism and inner-worldly 
mysticism since inner-worldly is now equated with asceticism and other-
worldly or fl ight-from-the-world with mysticism.26
Schluchter’s attempt to rescue Weber’s typology from analytical and 
historical confusion and seeks to broaden the concepts of asceticism and 
mysticism from their equation with activity and passivity respectively. 
However, he continues to make the Weberian assumption that the direction 
of the religious effort of the mystic is necessarily other-worldly. This is 
seen by the fact that even though he allows for activity in the life of the 
mystic this cannot be considered as soteriologically signifi cant action 
within the world.
and third, the content given to these dimensions, that is to say, the end state: active or pas-
sive, and the means of getting there: asceticism and contemplation. It is important to note 
that Schluchter follows Weber in confi ning this typology to religious virtuosi, since the 
“masses” tend towards a naïve affi rmation of the world. In this sense he remains within We-
ber’s schema of prioritising the aristocratic model of salvation as sociologically signifi cant 
for a theory of action. Thus even were one to criticise the innovation of the Catholic Ref-
ormation as being confi ned to the religious virtuosi, this critique would not damage the so-
ciological signifi cance of this innovation for a Weberian typology, which itself is confi ned 
to religious virtuosi (cf. Schluchter, op cit., p. 109). Nevertheless, even in his broadening 
of the types of asceticism and mysticism to be either active or passive in nature (Weber’s 
tool and vessel typology) and analytically separating these from the soteriological means of 
achieving these states (which are in turn reliant on a particular conception of God), that is to 
say, asceticism and mysticism, Schluchter continues to carry through Weber’s assumption 
of the necessary indifferent attitude to the world of the active contemplative into his own 
revised typology of means to salvation of the religious virtuosi. This effectively restricts the 
sociologically signifi cant typology of means to salvation to two “historically and psycho-
logically signifi cant” forms. That is to say, to the inner-worldly active mystic who pursues 
world mastery (type 1 in Schluchter’s schema) and the other-worldly passive mystic who 
fl ees from the world (type 4 in Schluchter’s schema). As Schluchter notes, these two types 
are the main ones considered by Weber in the Zwischenbetrachtung. Our critique here, is 
that in so limiting his typological scheme, Schluchter fails (as does Weber) to appreciate the 
sociological signifi cance of the inner-worldly active mystic who pursues world mastery for 
a theory of action. We shall argue that this type is one major innovation of the spirituality 
of the Catholic Reformation, which has not been theorised in Weberian inspired theories of 
action which remain, at least implicitly, confi ned to a Protestant metanarrative of consider-
ing the world as a massa perditionis, rather than also a place of grace.
26 This is probably due to his analytic interest in Einleitung of contrasting the Christian 
attitude of action with the Indian attitude of knowledge (and thus not contrasting Lutheran-
ism and Calvinism on the basis of emotionality as in PE).
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If we follow our scheme, it appears, at least on the level of the virtuosi, as 
if cosmocentrism and inner-worldly asceticism as well as theocentrism and 
inner-worldly mysticism “exclude” one another.27
This is obviously a logical consequence of the Protestant understanding 
of theocentrism, as the Deus Absconditus of Luther which is implicit in 
both Weber’s and Schluchter’s typological construction. This becomes 
clearer a little later in Schluchter’s analysis of the specifi c contribution of 
ascetic Protestantism to the process of the disenchantment of the world.
Only in Calvinism and especially in Baptism, in short in ascetic Protestantism, 
is sacramental grace completely devalued in favour of a spiritual attitude and 
system of personal sanctifi cation. With this spiritual turn ascetic Protestantism 
carried the “religious disenchantment of the world to its ultimate conclusion.” 
In Weber’s view, ascetic Protestantism combines fi ve characteristics, which 
up to the Reformation no other salvation movement had successfully fused 
in Asia or the West: theocentrism, asceticism, inner-worldliness, personal 
sanctifi cation and virtuosity. Only this combination produces the religious 
motivation for world mastery.28
5. Legal Rationalisation and Disenchantment
No less signifi cant in Weber’s understanding of Disenchantment of the 
World is his sociology of law. Central to this is his Protestant conception 
of eschatology.
As a consequence of the New Testament’s eschatological withdrawal from the 
world, the basic writ of Christianity contains only such a minimum of formally 
27 Schluchter, Wolfgang, Die Enstehung des modernen Rationalismus. Eine Analyse 
von Max Webers von Max Webers Entwicklungsgeschichte des Okzidents, Frankfurt am 
Main, Suhrkamp, 1998, pp. 311-312. “Folgt man den Zuordnungen dieses Rasters, so schei-
nen sich nämlich, zumindest auf der Ebene der Virtuosenreligiosität, Kosmozentrismus und 
innerweltliche Askese sowie Theozentrismus und innerweltliche Mystik “auszuschließen”. 
28 Schluchter, 1998, op cit, pp. 324-325. “Erst im Calvinismus, vor allem aber bei 
den täufersischen Denominationen, kurz: im asketischen Protestantismus, werden diese 
als Heilsmittel zugunsten der gottgeheiligten Gesinnung und der zum System gesteigerten 
Werkheiligkeit total entwertet. Mit dieser ‚spiritualistischen’ Wendung aber hat er zugleich 
die religiöse Entzauberung’ der Welt in ihren letzten Konsequenzen durchgeführt. Der as-
ketische Protestantismus kombiniert also in Webers Sicht fünf Merkmale, die bis zur Re-
formation keine andere erlösungsreligiöse Strömung in Asien oder im Okzident erfolgreich 
kombiniert hatte: Theozentrismus, Asketismus, Innerweltlichkeit, subjecktive Werkheilig-
keit und Virtuosentum. Erst diese Kombination schafft die religiöse Motivation für Welt-
beherrschung”.
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binding norms of a ritual or legal character that the way was left entirely free 
for purely rational enactment.29
Weber follows here the more Protestant understanding of eschatology 
defended by Luther and particularly Calvin in rejecting the realised 
eschatology in ecclesiological and sacramental form. This found new form 
in the Protestant History of Religion school conception of eschatology. 
The publication in 1892 of Johannes Weiß’s Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche 
Gottes (The Sermon of Jesus on the Kingdom of God) had marked a crucial 
moment in nineteenth-century Protestant theology.30 Weiß rejected the 
view put forward by his stepfather Albrecht Ritschl, that eschatology found 
its embodiment in the ethical action for the kingdom of God and rather, 
like Calvin, saw the kingdom of God as an eschatological future-oriented 
transcendental reality which found no trace in present historical reality. 
This clearly fi tted well with Weber’s conception of legal rationalisation 
as being allowed by the eschatological withdrawal from the world as 
interpreted by the liberal Protestant eschatology of Johannes Weiß. It left 
morality and law the eschatological freedom to be grounded in secular 
reason and, in this way, Weber interprets Luther’s opposition between “the 
law and the Gospel” as being prefi gured in New Testament eschatological 
rejection of the world. The consequence, of course, is that the way is 
opened to rationalise the legal procedure of the world since, whilst the 
Gospel concentrates on the world to come, secular rationality serves the 
needs of this world.31 The withdrawal of eschatology from the world thus 
29 WuG, p. 480. “und das Neue Testament enthielt nur ein solches Minimum formal 
bindender Normen rituellen oder rechtlichen Charakters – eine Folge der eschatologi-
schen Weltabgewandtheit -, daß eben dadurch die Bahn völlig frei war für rein rationale 
Satzung”.
30 See the article “Eschatologie”, in Theologische Realenzyklopädie, 1982, Vol. X., 
p. 328.
31 Indeed Weber’s argument here also resembles that of Rudolf Sohm’s critique of the 
Catholic understanding of canon law. Sohm argued (following Luther and Calvin) that be-
cause any visible church was not the church of Christ but merely a human community, then 
the true church of Christ was invisible and guided by the Spirit directly through the various 
charisms which the Spirit freely gives. This meant that canon law was simply a human crea-
tion with no justifi cation in the Gospel since the old law (in the Pauline sense) was in op-
position to the new freedom of the children of God. The “Justifi cation by Faith” teaching of 
Luther provides the framework in which this understanding of canon law was developed by 
Sohm. It sees a clear opposition between visible and invisible church, history and eschatol-
ogy, and the kingdom of God and the world. This Protestant tradition informs Weber’s own 
categorisation and once again positions his theory of legal rationalisation fi rmly within the 
liberal Protestant tradition. For a systematic discussion of Sohm’s work and its critique of 
the Catholic tradition of canon law see, Reinhold Sebott, Fundamentalkaonistik. Grund und 
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serves the advance of Weber’s Protestant conception of modernity and its 
legal rationalisation.32
6. Disenchantment and Rationality in the Munich Speeches
In his two famous Munich speeches: Science as a Vocation, Science, and 
Politics as a Vocation, Politics, Weber raises the question of how one can 
follow a vocation when one is no longer charged with the task of showing 
“the path of God”. This is the modern condition of the Disenchantment of 
the World for Weber.
Under these internal presuppositions, what is the meaning of science as 
a vocation, now after all these former illusions, “the way to true being,” the “way 
to true nature,” the “way to true God,” the “way to true happiness,” have been 
dispelled? Tolstoy has given the simplest answer with these words: “Science 
is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only important 
question for us: What shall we do and how shall we live?” ’ That science does 
not give an answer to this is indisputable. The only question that remains is the 
sense in which science gives “no” answer, and whether or not science might 
yet be of some use to the one who puts the question correctly.33
Interesting also in Science is that Weber defi nes his concept of disen-
chantment as mastery of the world through calculation, a consequence of 
the rationalisation and intellectualisation of the modern world. 
The increasing intellectualisation and rationalisation do not, therefore, indicate 
an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives. 
It means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that, if one but 
Grenzen des Kirchenrechts, Frankfurt am Main, Knecht, 1993. For an excellent short article 
on Sohm’s critique of the Catholic tradition of canon law see, Yves Congar, “R. Sohm nous 
interroge encore,” Revue de science philosophiques et théologique, 57, 1973, pp. 263-294.
32 Weber also notes the importance of the strong universalistic Roman law tradition in 
Italy which served the Italian bourgeoisie in the Italian city states in limiting the univer-
salistic pretensions of the Papacy and in this sense, allowed for a secular legal space to be 
preserved. See WuG, p. 481.
33 Science, p. 598. “Kehren wir zurück. Was ist unter diesen inneren Voraussetzungen 
der Sinn der Wissenschaft als Beruf, da alle diese früheren Illusionen: »Weg zum wahren 
sein«, »Weg zur wahren Kunst«, »Weg zur wahren Natur«, »Weg zum wahren Gott«, »Weg 
zum wahren Glück«, versunken sind? Die einfachste Antwort hat Tolstoj gegeben mit den 
Worten: »Sie ist sinnlos, weil sie auf die allein für uns wichtige Frage:, Was sollen wir tun? 
Wie sollen wir leben?, keine Antwort gibt.« Die Tatsache, daß sie diese Antwort nicht gibt, 
ist schlechthin unbestreitbar. Die Frage ist nur, in welchem Sinne sie »keine« Antwort gibt, 
und ob sie statt dessen nicht doch vielleicht dem, der die Frage richtig stellt, etwas leisten 
könnte.”
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wishes, one could learn it at any time. Hence, it means that principally there 
are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one 
can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world 
is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order 
to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious 
powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service. This 
above all is what intellectualisation means.34
Thus the capacity to calculate provides a non-magical or disenchanted 
form of the mastery of the world. Again one hears echo’s of Weber’s notions 
of asceticism, of personality, and of the anti-sacramental understanding of 
existence. The typically Protestant notion of the removal of all traces of 
God from the cosmos, the so-called Catholic notion of vestigium trinitatis, 
is a necessary condition for Weber’s understanding of disenchantment, 
intellectualisation and rationalisation.
Friedman Voigt has looked at the indebtedness of Weber to Protestant 
theology in his Munich speeches, noting the particular infl uence of the Old 
Testament scholar Julius Welhausen on the prophets. Weber employs the 
idea of the prophet that he had used in his study of ancient Judaism in his 
Munich speeches to speak of the uncompromising, honest individual who 
has special knowledge and is charged with communicating this knowledge 
to the people.
This conception of the prophet essentially becomes Weber’s model for 
the “man of vocation” in both Science and Politics. The prophet represented 
the individual who stood against the compromises of the institution, the 
charismatically inspired man of conviction who felt called to speak the 
truth regardless of the consequences. This intellectual honesty of the 
Jewish prophets was the sign and the embodiment of reason, of a process 
of rationalisation in which Judaism clearly represented an advance over the 
sacrifi cial practices of the mythological priesthoods of the other ancient 
Near Eastern peoples. The ethical demands of these prophets, to care for 
the poor and the weak, for foreigners and widows and orphans replaced the 
34 Science, p. 594. “Die zunehmende Intellektualisierung und Rationalisierung bedeu-
tet also nicht eine zunehmende allgemeine Kenntnis der Lebensbedingungen, unter denen 
man steht. Sondern sie bedeutet etwas anderes: das Wissen davon oder den Glauben daran: 
daß man, wenn man nur wollte, es jederzeit erfahren könnte, daß es also prinzipiell keine 
geheimnisvollen unberechenbaren Mächte gebe, die da hineinspielen, daß man vielmehr 
alle Dinge – im Prinzip – durch Berechnen beherrschen könne. Das aber bedeutet: die Ent-
zauberung der Welt. Nicht mehr, wie der Wilde, für den es solche Mächte gab, muß man zu 
magischen Mitteln greifen, um die Geister zu beherrschen oder zu erbitten. Sondern tech-
nische Mittel und Berechnung leisten das. Dies vor allem bedeutet die Intellektualisierung 
als solche.”
134 ANTHONY J. CARROLL, S.J.
priestly demands for sacrifi cial appeasement of the gods through ritually 
controlled practices. The price paid by the prophet for such uncompromising 
honesty was separation from the ordinary life of the people in order to 
ensure the preservation of the integrity of his message. It was this ascetical 
picture of the prophets of Israel which became for Weber the paragon for 
the man of vocation under the conditions of disenchantment, that is, in the 
modern secular world. This image of the prophet was a typical one in the 
Protestant History of Religion school at the end of the nineteenth century 
and clearly provided Weber with a framework for his notions of personality 
and asceticism that feature so prominently in his works from the Protestant 
Ethic to his Munich speeches.35 
The fi gure of the prophet is also used by Weber as symbol of true 
academic research free of the intellectual compromises of the dogmatically 
bound thinkers he found so repugnant. This notion of value-free science 
propagated by Weber was strongly critical of what he considered to be 
value-bound science as propagated by Catholic intellectuals and those that 
used their own academic posts to sell their own ideological positions. The 
Kulturkampf background to the German university system is clearly a major 
Protestant infl uence on Weber which sets the framework of his views. It is 
thus not surprising that we should fi nd a theological critique in Weber’s 
Science, as theology represented par excellence that academic discipline 
in which the history of Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries had shown was most susceptible to the dangers of indoctrination. 
Protestantism is thus represented by Weber as the inheritor of the honesty 
and intellectual rigour of the Jewish prophets against the ideological and 
institutionally compromised position of the Catholic Church which only 
propagated the decadence of intellectual dilettantism. Consequently, the 
separation of religious convictions from scientifi c research, the major form 
in which Science conceives the disenchantment of the world and the process 
of secularisation under the modern conditions of intellectualisation, is 
itself a Protestant position which Weber inherits from Schleiermacher and 
much of nineteenth-century Protestant thought and adopts in his address 
to the students in Munich as his vision of the vocation of an academic in 
modernity.
This lack of objectivity in science is characteristic of Catholicism, for 
Weber, and found its embodiment in the Catholic Centre Party, the Zentrum. 
35 See, Friedemann Voigt, “Das Protestantische Erbe in Max Webers Vorträgen über 
‘Wissenschaft als Berfu’ und ‘Politik als Beruf’,” Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologie Ges-
chichte, 9, 2, 2002, p. 255.
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The confessionalisation of political parties and science was something 
Weber strongly resisted. He was outraged, on this front, by the appointment 
of a Catholic professors at the University of Strasbourg and this was an 
infl uence on his stress on objectivity in his Munich speeches.36
Thus in Science and Politics we fi nd different routes for the elimination 
of religion from these spheres in the process of secularisation. For Science, 
on the one hand, religion is eliminated because of the need for intellectual 
honesty, as freedom from value commitment ensures methodological 
objectivity. For Politics, on the other hand, religion is to remove itself from 
political engagement because the politics of responsibility, which alone can 
make the necessary compromises required for parliamentary democracy, 
are incompatible with the politics of conviction which are inevitable for the 
religious believer. Even more than that, Weber suggests that for religious 
convictions to remain pure, the religious believer has to remove himself 
from the political sphere, as Jeremiah did from the community, in order to 
preserve these convictions from contamination with the compromises of 
the world. In both Science and Politics then the consequence is a retreat of 
the religious sphere into the privacy of the inner convictions of the heroic 
individual. A retreat mirrored in Weber’s own political convictions after the 
failure of his political career and his retreat into the scientifi cally pure world 
of academia. In a disenchanted world the compromises of instrumentally 
rational politicians are to ensure that power remains in the hands of the 
state, whatever the cost. 
III. CONCLUSION
In the philosophical discourse of modernity the concept of rationality 
has provided a framework which orchestrates a dominant account of the 
emergence of Western civilisation. Beginning with the Pre-Socratics or 
the reform movements within ancient Judaism this narrative has mixed 
together normative and descriptive elements in ways which have often 
purported to be simply the neutral march of science and progress. I have 
argued that Max Weber’s version of this account has fused a Protestant 
normative vision together with a philosophical and sociological description 
of the developmental dominance of formal and instrumental rationalities in 
the Western world. Revealing the particularity of this account of modernity 
36 On Weber’s handling of the disputes over value-free research, see Joachim Radkau, 
Max Weber. Die Leidenschaft des Denkens, München Wien, Hanser, 2005, pp. 614-642.
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opens up a fascinating research program which has recently been called 
“sub-altern”37 studies or “multiple-modernities.”38 Essentially, the core 
idea here is, following a well rehearsed intuition of Charles Taylor, accounts 
of modernity are empowered by a normative vision which grounds their 
conceptions of the good, and provides civilisations with a measure of 
their own worth.39 Uncovering the normative vision of the West reveals 
the often hidden normative presuppositions that embody this particular 
account of modernity.
In articulating a Protestant account of modernity Max Weber has 
provided a general narrative account of the emergence of the Western world 
that has infl uenced thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, 
and John Rawls. However, these normative visions fall into the trap of 
providing overly homogenised accounts of Western modernity which are 
blind to their own particular normative presuppositions.40 In locating the 
normative presuppositions of Weber’s concepts of disenchantment and 
rationality in a nineteenth century Protestant account of modernity one 
cannot help but ask, what other conceptions of modernity might illuminate 
about both the particularity and singularity of the West?41
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